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Abstract 
This thesis examines aspects of the critique, undertaken by Jacques Derrida, of 
phonocentrism in western thought. Its initial focus is Derrida's early work on the 
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl and the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Both thinkers, 
Derrida argues, demonstrate their commitment to metaphysics through their reliance on 
a notion of (silent) voice intimately aligned to intellection. In Derrida's reading, Saussure 
and Husserl reduce to varying degrees sounded voice and writing, considering them 
irreducibly exterior to the unity of inner voice and thought. The thesis next argues vis-a.­
vis this critique that Derrida himself reduces voice to silence, and mobilises, as a key 
facet of his program, a trope of silent inscription. Guided by a range of critiques of 
Derrida, the thesis asserts that the early Derrida remains, in this aspect of his work, 
intra-metaphysical. Against Derrida, the thesis posits a sonorous voice incommensurable 
with the silent voice which is both the object and outcome of Derrida's polemic against 
phonocentrism. The thesis also notes the complicity of metaphors of vision with the 
phonocentric bent in Western thought. In closing, the thesis speculatively asserts, again 
by adducing a number of critiques of Derridean thought, that Derrida (1) arguably relies 
for his anti-phonocentric critique on the ocularcentrism which he contends is concomitant 
with phonocentrism in western thought and (2) aporetically recognises the inadequacy of 




From Emil Behnke, The mechanism of the 
human voice, London: J Curwen and Sons Ltd., 1880. 
From Mark C Taylor, Altarity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987. 
PLATE XII. 
VIEW OF THE VOICEBOX, OR LARYNX, WHICH H.-\S 
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Figure 1 
0 mathematicians, shed light on error such as this! The spirit has no voice, because 
where there is voice, there is body. 
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Preface 
The voice, Jacques Derrida contends, is consciousness itself. It is complicit with 
the notions of being, temporal presence and conscious interiority which found western 
thought. And since Derrida's intention, as the deconstructive philosopher par 
excellence, is to question presence, and the privileging of voice which subtends ontology, 
the theme of the voice will organise Derrida's early polemical trajectory. In Speech 
and Phenomena and Of Grammatology Derrida will engage in a systematic 
deconstruction of the metaphysical conflation of voice and thought which he believes 
to be the principium of onto-theology. In the former text, Derrida deconstructs Husserl's 
notion of mute voice; in the latter, he turns his attention to, amongst others, Saussure. 
For Husserl and Saussure it is not in the sounded voice, with its ineffaceable connection 
to physical, embodied sonority, where an affinity with intellection will be found, but in 
the utterly silent s 'entendre parler, the hearing-oneself-speak. And as Derrida's 
expositions unfold, it becomes clear that the critique of voice, or as Derrida puts it, the 
"neutralisation" of the phone, relies on his key notion-differance-in its various 
tropes as writing (ecriture), spacing, the strace, and the gram. 
This thesis unfolds in three parts. Chapters One and Two attempt a close reading 
of Derrida's interpretation of phonocentrism in Speech and Phenomena and Of 
Grammatology vis-a-vis Husserl and Saussure respectively. Tracing the contours of 
Derrida's polemic on these thinkers lays the groundwork for a return to Derrida 
himself: it ultimately becomes possible to juxtapose Derrida's own arguments around 
phonocentrism with the paradoxical yield of his critique. The deconstructive 
confrontation with voice is itself arguably aporetic: there is an utter elision of aurality, 
including that of the sounded voice, in Derrida's early work. The paradigmatic instance 
of this effacement is the neologism at the wellspring of the Derridean project. The 
difference between difference and differance-the orthographic innovation which 
swaps an a for an e-can only be seen, and cannot be heard. Differance relies on a trope 
of mute inscription. 
In one sense, this suppression of voice is entirely appropriate. Since Derrida 
wants to abrogate the phenomenological and structuralist privileging of the phone, his 
cardinal neographism serves as a salient instance of the textual practice of anti­
phonocentrism. It literally defers voice, irrevocably. On the other hand the assiduity 
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of Derrida's approach ends, not unproblematically, in silence. Against his own 
arguments that differance (as spacing) introduces the ''body" and the "world" into the 
silence of ratiocination, Derrida himself renders voice aphonic, bifurcating the "body" 
of speech, its physical, "worldly" sonority, from its relationship to noesis. In the view 
of a number of the critiques adduced here, he reproduces the founding dichotomy 
between the sensible voice and the pure, transparent intelligibility of the silent phone 
in western thought. Ultimately, his own critique falls back within the horizon of a 
philosophical axiology that sets a mute voice, and the silent letter, at the solipsistic 
centre of an intra-philosophical program. Chapter Three traces this problem, and 
attempts to explore the possibility of a 'deconstructed' yet sonorous voice, as theorised 
by various thinkers including the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
This thesis arises from a desire to think through the immensely enigmatic 
medium that is strangely fractured between, and co-implicated with, body and 
thought, alterity and identity, other and self-a question which ultimately goes 
begging in early Derrideanism, as voice fades away into an intractable aphonia. A more 
comprehensive attempt to confront sounded voice and its relation to corporeality, 
intellection and intersubjectivity-or indeed its relation to technologies of recording, 
reproduction and simulation-would be the subject of another work, undoubtedly less 
focused on the byzantine argumentation of the early Derrida. Nevertheless, I hope the 
question of embodied voice and, perhaps, the possibility of dialogue, reverberates in 
the margins of the final chapter, in which I attempt, possibly against the odds, to prise 
open Derridean solipsism. I have concluded really where I had desired to begin: at the 
point at which the question of the voice can be heard. 
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